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Abstract 
Belief revision and belief update have heen proposed as two types of belief change serving 
different purposes, revision intended to capture changes in belief state reflecting new information 
about a static world, and update intended to capture changes of belief in response to a changing 
world. We argue that routine belief change involves elements of both and present a model of 
generalized update that allows updates in response to external changes to inform an agent about 
its prior beliefs. This model of update combines aspects of revision and update, providing a more 
realistic characterization of belief change. We show that, under certain assumptions, the original 
update poatulates are satisfied. We also demonstrate hat plain revision and plain update are special 
cases of our model. We also draw parallels to models of stochastic dynamical systems, and use this 
to develop a model that deals with iterated update and noisy observations in qualitative settings 
that is analogous to Bayesian updating in a quantitative setting. @ 1998 Elsevier Science B.V. 
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1. Introduction 
An unaderlying premise in much work addressing the design of intelligent agents or 
programs is that such agents should (either implicitly or explicitly) hold beliefs about 
the true state of the world. Typically, these beliefs are incomplete, for there is much an 
agent wil.1 not know about its environment. In realistic settings one must also expect an 
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agent’s beliefs to be incorrect from time to time. If an agent is in a position to make 
observations and detect such errors, a mechanism is required whereby the agent can 
change its beliefs to incorporate new information. Finally, an agent that finds itself in a 
dynamic, evolving environment (including evolution brought about by its own actions) 
will be required to change its beliefs about the environment as the environment evolves. 
Theories of belief change have received considerable attention in recent years in the 
AI community, as well as other areas such as philosophy and database systems. One 
crucial distinction that has come to light in this work is that between belief revision 
and belief update. The distinction can be best understood as one pertaining to the 
source of incorrect beliefs. On the one hand, an agent’s beliefs about the world may 
simply be mistaken or incomplete, for instance, in the case where it adopts some default 
belief. If an agent observes that this belief is mistaken, it must take steps to correct 
the misconception. Such a process is know as belief revision, of which the theory 
of Alchourr6n, Gardenfors and Makinson [2,15] is the best-known characterization. 
On the other hand, an agent’s beliefs, while correct at one time, may have become 
inaccurate due to changes in the world. As events occur and other agents act, or as the 
agent itself takes actions, certain facts become true and others false. An agent observing 
such processes or their results must take steps to ensure its state of belief reflects these 
changes, This process is known as belief update, as proposed by Winslett [33] and 
Katsuno and Mendelzon [ 2 11. 
On the surface, formalizations of revision and update are quite similar: in both cases, 
the objective is to define a function that, given the agent’s belief state and an “observed” 
proposition, returns a new belief state. However, conceptually these two processes have 
been treated distinctly, and the axioms and semantic models proposed to capture revision 
and update are, for the most part, incompatible-that is, we cannot treat update as a 
form of revision, nor can we treat revision as a form of update. The properties of these 
processes are, we shall argue, fundamentally different. 
One difficulty with the separation of revision and update is the fact that routine belief 
change, that is the change of an agent’s belief state in response to some observation, 
typically involves elements of both. We will support below the claim that a given 
observation often calls for belief change that reflects a response to changes in the world 
as well as incorrect or incomplete prior beliefs. In this paper, we describe a semantic 
model for belief change that unifies the two types of belief change. In particular, we 
generalize classical belief update to incorporate aspects of belief revision. The aim of this 
model is twofold. First, we provide a unifying and natural semantics for both revision 
and update that highlights the orthogonal roles both have to play in routine belief change. 
Second, we attempt to provide a more compelling account of belief update to deal with 
observations of changes in the world that provide information about the prior world state 
(i.e., about the agent’s prior beliefs). This second objective is a response to difficulties 
with the classical view of update, which we outline below. 
The result of this union is a more robust and realistic notion of update in which 
observations of change can inform an agent’s prior beliefs and expectations. Such ob- 
servations are pervasive; consider the following example. A warehouse control agent 
believes it is snowing on Route 1 after yesterday’s weather forecast, and expects the 
arrival of a number of trucks to be delayed. Now suppose a certain truck arrives, causing 
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the agent to update its beliefs; furthermore, contrary to its expectations, the truck arrives 
on time. There are two possible explanations: either the truck was able to speed through 
the snow or it did not snow after all. If the latter explanation is more plausible, current 
update theories cannot arrive at the desired update in a natural way. The observation 
of the change in the world’s state (arrival of the truck) indicates that the agent’s prior 
beliefs (e.g., that it is snowing) were wrong. The update should not simply involve 
changes that reflect the evolution of the world, but should place these changes in the 
context of the corrected or revised prior beliefs. The agent should revise its beliefs to 
capture the fact that it is did not snow and adjust its expectations regarding the arrival 
of other trucks accordingly. Routine belief changes often involve aspects of revision 
(correcting or augmenting one’s beliefs) and update (allowing beliefs about the world 
to “evolve”) . 
The general model we present to capture such considerations takes as a starting point 
the notion of ranked or structured belief sets. By ranking situations according to their 
degree of plausibility, we obtain a natural way of assessing degrees of belief and a 
very natural semantics for belief revision. Such models have been used extensively for 
revision [ 6, 15,201. To this we add the notion of a transition or evolution from one 
world state to another. As proposed by Katsuno and Mendelzon (KM), updates reflect 
changes in the world, and transitions can be used to model such changes. However, 
in contrast to the KM model and following our earlier work [ 81, we assume that the 
relative plausibility of transitions (and hence possible updates) is not something that is 
judged directly; rather we assume that events or actions provide the impetus for change. 
The plausibility of a transition is a function of: (a) the plausibility of possible causing 
events; and (b) the likelihood of that event having the specified outcome. In this way, 
we can model events or actions that have defeasible effects (which can be judged as 
more or less likely). 
Finally., in response to an observation, an agent attempts to explain the observation by 
postulating conditions under which that observation is expected. An explanation consists 
of three components: initial conditions, an event (or action), and an outcome of that 
event. The key aspect of our model is the ranking of such explanations-an explanation 
is more or less plausible depending on the plausibility of the initial conditions, the 
plausibility of the event given that starting point, and the plausibility of the event’s 
outcome. The belief change that results provides the essence of the generalized updare 
(GU) operator: an agent believes the consequences of the most plausible explanations 
of the observation. 
Unlike other theories of update, our model allows an agent to trade off the likelihood 
of possible events, outcomes and prior beliefs in coming up with plausible explanations 
of an observation. Of course, by allowing prior beliefs to be “changed” during update, 
we are essentially folding belief revision into the update process (as we elaborate 
below). TNe thus generalize the KM update model to work on structured (rather than 
flat) belief sets. Furthermore, the information required to generate such explanations 
is very n,atural and readily available. We are much more willing to judge the relative 
plausibility of events and their outcomes than the plausibility of transitions directly. The 
resulting change in belief, consisting of the consequences of the explanation, is very 
intuitive. 
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In Section 2 we present the ACM theory of revision and the KM theory of update, 
focusing primarily on the semantic models that have been proposed. In our presentation, 
we adopt the qualitative probabilistic model of [ 18,19,31]. In Section 3 we present our 
model of generalized update, with an emphasis on semantics, and contrast it with the 
“flat” KM model. We describe two examples to illustrate the key features of the model. 
In Section 4 we analyze the GU operator in detail. We describe the formal relationship 
between revision, update and CU. We show that under certain assumptions GU satisfies 
the KM postulates, though we argue that these assumptions are not appropriate in many 
settings (thus calling into question the generality of the KM postulates). In addition 
we show that both “flat” KM update and ACM revision are special cases of CU. In 
particular, the connection formally verifies the intuition that ACM revision is due to 
changes in beIief about a static world, while update reflects belief change about an 
evolving world. 
In Section 5, we briefly discuss the importance of iterated revision in this model, 
and emphasize connections between GU and Bayesian update in stochastic dynamical 
systems. We also discuss the role of observations and weight of evidence, and present a 
model (as well as several alternative suggestions) for dealing with “noisy” observations 
in belief revision. This is one area of belief revision and belief update that has received 
virtually no attention. 
There have been attempts to provide general semantics for belief change operators 
(e.g., [ 121) ; but often these models are such that under certain assumptions the change 
is a revision and under others it is an update. In Section 6 we compare some of these 
related models to GU. We conclude in Section 7 with some directions for future research. 
Proofs of the main results are found in the Appendix. 
2. Classical belief revision and belief update 
In this section we review, in turn, the ACM and KM theories of belief change. 
We present both the syntactic postulates and the semantic models that characterize these 
theories and describe briefly the K-calculus of [ 18,19,3 11, which provides an alternative 
model for the ordering relationships used by both theories. 
Throughout, we assume that an agent has a deductively closed belief set K, a set 
of sentences drawn from some logical language reflecting the agent’s beliefs about the 
current state of the world. For ease of presentation, we assume a logically finite, classical 
propositional language, denoted L cp~. and consequence operation Cn. 3 The belief set 
K will often be generated by some finite knowledge base KB (i.e., K = Cn( KB)). The 
identically true and false propositions are denoted T and I, respectively. Given a set 
of possible worlds (or valuations over LCPL) W and A E LCPL, we denote by ]I A 11 the 
set of A-worlds, the elements of W satisfying A. The worlds satisfying all sentences in 
a set K is denoted IIKII. 
3 Languages with a denumerable set of atomic variables, or first-order languages pose no special difficulties 
(e.g., see work on first-order conditional logics). 
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2.1. Belief revision 
Given a belief set K, an agent will often obtain information A not present in K. In 
this case, K must be revised to incorporate A. If A is consistent with K, one expects 
A to simply be added to K: we call KAf = Cn( K U {A}) the expansion of K by A. 
More problematic is the case when K k TA; certain beliefs must be given up before A 
is adopted. The AGA4 theory provides a set of guidelines, in the form of the following 
postulates, governing this process. We use K: to denote the revision of K by A. 
(Rl) Kz is a belief set (i.e., deductively closed). 
(R2) A E K;;. 
(R3) K; & K;. 
(R4) If TA 4 K then Ki C Ki. 
(R5) Ki =Cn(_L) iff /-- TA. 
(R6) If+A=BthenKz=Ki. 
(R7) K;,,, C (K:);. 
(R8) If +I 4 K$ then (K;t)i C KiAB. 
Unfortunately, while the postulates constrain possible revisions, they do not dictate 
the precise beliefs that should be retracted when A is observed. An alternative model of 
revision, based on the notion of epistemic entrenchment [ 151, has a more constructive 
nature. Given a belief set K, we can characterize the revision of K by ordering beliefs 
according to our willingness to give them up. If one of two beliefs must be retracted in 
order to accommodate some new fact, the Iess entrenched belief will be relinquished, 
while the more entrenched persists. 
Semantically, an entrenchment relation (hence a revision function) can be modeled 
using an ordering on possible worlds reflecting their relative plausibility [ 6,201. How- 
ever, rather than use a qualitative ranking relation, we adopt the presentation of [ 18,3 1 ] 
and rank all possible worlds using a K-ranking. Such a ranking K : W -+ N assigns 
to each world a natural number reflecting its plausibility or degree of believability. If 
K(W) < K(U) then w is more plausible than u or “more consistent” with the agent’s 
beliefs. WG: insist that K-~ (0) # 8, so that maximally plausible worlds are assigned 
rank 0. These maximally plausible worlds are exactly those consistent with the agent’s 
beliefs; that is, the epistemically possible worlds according to K are those deemed most 
plausible i;n K (see [ 311 for further details). We sometimes assume K is a partial func- 
tion, and loosely write K(W) = co to mean K(W) is not defined (i.e., w is not in the 
domain of K, or w is impossible). 
Rather than modeling an agent’s epistemic state with a “flat” unstructured belief set K, 
we use a /c-ranking to capture objective beliefs K as well as entrenchment information 
that determines how an agent will revise K. An epistemic state K induces the (objective) 
belief set 
K= {A E LCPL I K-'(o) C IIAII}. 
In other words, the set of most plausible worlds (those such that K(W) = 0) determine 
the agent’s beliefs. The ranking K also induces a revision function: to revise by A 
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k=l Inside(B),Inside(G) 
k=O ( Patio(B),Patio(G) ) 
Fig. I. A revision model. 
an agent adopts the most plausible A-worlds as epistemically possible. Thus, using 
min(A, K) to denote this set, we have 
Ki={B E LCPL 1 min(A,~) C 11B11). 
IfllAljnPV=@,wesetmin(A,K)=0andK~=L opt (the inconsistent belief set). It is 
normally assumed that l[All f~ W Z 0 for every satisfiable A-thus every proposition is 
accorded some degree of plausibility. It is well known that this type of model induces 
the class of revision functions sanctioned by the AGM postulates [ 6,18,20]. 4 
The ranking function K can naturally be interpreted as characterizing the degree to 
which an agent is willing to accept certain alternative states of affairs as epistemically 
possible. As such it seems to be appropriate for modeling changes in belief about an 
unchanging world. The most plausible A-worlds in our assessment of the current state 
of affairs are adopted when A is observed. 
As an example, consider the ranking shown in Fig. 1, which reflects the epistemic 
state of someone who believes her book and glasses are on the patio. If she were to 
learn that in fact her book is inside, she would also believe her glasses are inside, for the 
most plausible Insi@ B) -world (K = 1) also satisfies Znside( G) . This model captures 
that fact that she strongly believes she left her book and glasses in the same place; 
that is, the belief Patio(B) = Patio(G) is more entrenched than either of the beliefs 
Putia( B) or Putio( G). 
We can also view K-rankings as assigning degrees of plausibility to propositions; we 
define 
K(A) = Ikl{K( W)}. 
4 We refer to [4,6, 12, 191 for a discussion of languages with which one can express properties of belief 
sets and revision functions. These languages can be used to express belief, degrees of entrenchment and 
plausibility, conditional belief, and so on. 
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This can be interpreted as the degree to which proposition A is accepted as plausible 
(where KC A) = 0 means A is maximally plausible, or consistent with the agent’s 
beliefs). We will also have occasion to use the notion of conditional plausibility; we 
define 
K(B(,4) = K(A A B) - K(A). 
Intuitively. this denotes the degree to which B would be considered plausible if A were 
believed. 
These notions are strongly reminiscent of standard concepts from probability theory. 
In fact, a K-ranking can be interpreted as a semi-qualitative probability distribution. 
Using the &-semantics of Adams [ 11, Goldszmidt and Pearl [ 171 show how one can 
interpret the (unconditional and conditional) K values of propositions as “order of 
magnitude” probabilities. Under this interpretation, one is able to define analogs of 
various probabilistic operations, including conditionalization (see Section 5). We do not 
delve into the details of “K-arithmetic” here, nor the details of the precise relationship 
of these ranking functions to probability distributions. We refer to [ 17,19,31] for 
details. We do note, however, that addition, multiplication and division of probabilities 
correspond to the minimum, addition and subtraction operations, respectively, for K- 
rankings. Thus the definition of K( BI A) above can be seen as a direct counterpart of 
the usual definition of conditional probability. 
Much of the semantics we define below could be reinterpreted in a purely qualitative 
framework. for belief revision (and belief update) in which a simple ordering relation 6 
is used to rank possible worlds. However, as will become evident in Sections 4 and 5, 
much of what we do relies on the expressive power afforded by a quantitative ranking. In 
particular, our semantics will require that one be able to combine plausibilities that are 
specified using several distinct rankings. With quantitative K-rankings, this is straight- 
forward, whereas qualitative rankings do not permit this unless explicit “calibration” 
information is provided. We elaborate on this in Sections 4 and 5. 
2.2. Belief update 
Katsuno and Mendelzon [ 211 have proposed a general characterization of belief 
update tha.t seems appropriate when an agent wishes to change its beliefs to reflect 
changes in, or evolution of, the world. The KM theory is also captured by a set of 
postulates and an equivalent semantic model. Following [21], we describe update in 
terms of a knowledge base KB rather than a deductively closed belief set K. 
If some new fact A is observed in response to some (unspecified) change in the world 
(i.e., some action or event occurrence), then the formula KB o A denotes the new belief 
set incorporating this change. The KM postulates governing admissible update operators 
are: 
(Ul) KBoA t_ A. 
(U2) IfKB/-AthenKBoA = KB. 
(U3) If KB and A are satisfiable, then KB o A is satisfiable. 
(U4) I~‘/-AAB,KB~EKB~,~~~~KB~~A=KB:!~B. 
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(U5) (KBoA) AB t_ KBo(A/\B). 
(U6) IfKBoA~BandKBoB~AthenKBoA=KBoB. 
(U7) If KB is complete then (DoA) A(KBoB) k KBo(AVB). 
(U8) (KB, vKB2) oA = (KBi oA) v (KBzoA). 
The equivalent semantic model of KM sheds more light on the intuitions underlying 
update. IlKBll P re resents the set of possibilities we are prepared to accept as the actual 
state of affairs. Since observation A is the result of some change in the actual world, 
we ought to consider, for each possibility w E [[KBll, the most plausible way (or 
ways) in which w might have changed in order to make A true. That is, we want to 
consider the most plausible evolurioa of world w into a world satisfying the observation 
A. To capture this intuition, Katsuno and Mendelzon propose a family of preorders 
{<,I w E W}, where each Gw is a reflexive, transitive relation over W. We interpret 
each such relation as follows: if u 6, u then u is at least as plausible a change relative 
to w as is u; that is, situation w would more readily evolve into u than it would into u. 
Finally, a faithfulness condition is imposed: for every world w, the preorder <, has 
w as a minimum element; that is, w <,,, u for all u # w. Naturally, the most plausible 
candidate changes in w that result in A are those worlds u satisfying A that are minimal 
in the relation &. The set of such minimal A-worlds for each relation <,,,, and each 
w E llm11, intuitively capture the situations we ought to accept as possible when 
updating KB with A. In other words, 
IJKB 0 AlI = U {min(A, G)}, 
we Ilkall 
where min(A, <,) is the set of minimal elements in [[All (with respect to 6,). 
Update operators determined by any family of preorders { <,,, w E W} satisfy the 
KM postulates. The converse also holds: any KM operator can be represented by such a 
semantic model. Moreover, if the orderings & are total preorders (so that all elements 
are comparable), then update operators are characterized by (Ul ) -( US) (see [ 8,211) : 
(U9) If KB is complete, (KB o A) /f TB and (KB o A) t_ C, 
then (KBo(AAB)) FC. 
We assume for the most part that we are dealing with such total update operators 
(but we discuss this further in Section 4). It should be clear how this (total) model can 
be recast in terms of K-rankings: we simply associate a ranking K, with each world w 
(such that K;’ (0) = {w}) an d use min(A, K,+) to update by A. Note that the use of 
K-rankings requires that the orderings be total. 
As a concrete example, suppose that someone observes that the grass in front of her 
house is wet. Prior to the observation, she believed that she left her book outside on 
the patio and that the grass and book were dry (see KB in Fig. 2). As shown in the 
figure, the most plausible evolution of the epistemically possible world w, given the wet 
grass, is u; hence she believes her book got wet too. This may be due to the fact that 
the most likely cause of wet grass is rain, which dampens things on the patio as well. A 
less plausible transition (world u) is caused by the sprinkler being activated. However, 
had she observed D-y(B) in addition to Wet(G), she would have accepted this less 
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Wet(G) Wet(G) 
Fig. 2. An update model. 
plausible e.xplanation-that the sprinkler had been turned on-and any of its additional 
consequences, such as her glasses being dry if they are with her book. 
2.3. An event-based semantics for update 
One of the difficulties with the Kh4 update semantics is the interpretation of the 
orderings &. This semantics supposes that it is “natural” to directly rank possible 
evolutions of a world w. In [ 81 we argue that evolutions or changes in the world should 
not be ranked directly. We suppose that events or actions provide the impetus for change, 
and the plausibility of a given evolution is determined by the plausibility of the event 
that caused the change. This approach is motivated by the observation that users can 
often more: readily assess the relative plausibility of an event (in a given context) and 
the effects of that event, as opposed to directly assessing the plausibility of an evolution. 
Apart from providing a more intuitive semantic foundation for belief update, this 
event-based model is more general than the KM model, and can be used to show that 
some of the KM postulates are too restrictive to be viewed as a general characterization 
of the process of belief update [8]. In order to unify update and revision, rather than 
generalizing the KM update semantics directly, we will base our unifying model on the 
event-based semantics of [ 81. We briefly review the basic elements of this semantics. 5 
We assume a set of events E. An event e maps each world into another world, and 
can be viewed as a function (perhaps partial), e : W + W. The world e(w) is the 
outcome of event e at world w. Events such as these are therefore deterministic. 6 
Since an agent making an observation will often not know a priori what event caused 
the observed fact to hold, we assume that each world has associated with it an event 
ordering ,u( w) that describes the plausibility of various event occurrences at that world. 
Formally, /u : W + (E + N) ; we write K,,, to denote the ranking p(w). Intuitively, 
I, captures the plausibility of the occurrence of event e at world w. Again, we 
assume K, is a partial function over E, with I,,, = cc taken to mean that e cannot 
5 Our presentation will rely on the use of K-rankings (which impose total preorders), whereas the semantics 
in [ 81 is purely qualitative (and permits preorders as plausibility relations). In the few places where this 
influences results, we will make the distinction clear. 
’ In [S], nondeterministic actions are captured by allowing set-vahted outcomes. In Section 3, we will want 
to generalize this further to allow these nondeterministic outcomes to be ranked according to plausibility. 
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occur at w. For each w, we require that I, = 0 for some event e (perhaps several), 
so that at least one event is considered most plausible. We take the set of events and 
the ranking functions K, to constitute an event model EM. 
With an event ordering in hand, one can easily rank the possible evolutions of a world 
w according to the relative plausibility of the events that could cause that evolution. In 
particular, we can define an outcome ranking h, for world w over the set W, where 
h,+,(u) denotes the degree of plausibility associated with the transition of world w to 
world u. This can be defined as 
A,(u) = mi;{K,(e) 1 e(w) = u}. 
In other words, the evolution of w into u is exactly as plausible as the most plausible 
event that causes w to evolve into u. 
In the case of a deterministic event model, we can define a belief update operator as 
follows: 
llKB%~All= U {min(A,h,)}. 
wEllKBll 
In other words, we simply use the ranking A, as we would the plausible change ordering 
<,+ in the KM model. One distinction is that for any observation A, one can use the 
event model to generate an explanation for that observation. In other words, one can 
determine the event-condition pairs, for any condition consistent with KB, such that 
event e is the most plausible cause of the observation A. To revisit the example above, 
the ordering & in Fig. 2 may be induced by the event ranking where K,( rain) = 0 
and K,( sprinkkr) = 1. Not only is the belief Wet(B) a consequence of observation 
Wet(G), but the explanation “It rained” is also forthcoming. We refer to [ 81 for further 
details. 
One can show that the event-based semantics for update generalizes the KM model. 
Under particular assumptions, the classes of update operators determined by each se- 
mantics coincide, though some of the necessary requirements on event models may, in 
certain cases, be unnecessarily restrictive [S]. We defer discussion of this issue until 
we examine our generalization of this event-based semantics below. A final advantage 
of this model is that it lends itself readily to the generalizations required to deal with 
nondeterministic events with outcomes of varying plausibilities, as well as the incorpo- 
ration of belief revision into the picture to provide a unifying semantics of belief change 
in dynamical systems. 
3. Generalized update 
In this section we first describe some of the difficulties with the Kh4 theory of update, 
as well as the event-based semantics described above, when it comes to dealing with the 
routine belief change of an agent embedded in a dynamical system. We then present the 
generalized update model, and illustrate the basic intuitions by means of two examples. 
We defer a formal analysis of its properties until the following section. 
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3.1. DifJiculties with KM update 
One difficulty with the KM theory of update is that it does not allow an observation to 
force revision of an agent’s beliefs about the state of the world prior to the observation. 
This is a crucial drawback, for even though one may not care about outdated beliefs 
directly, information gained about one’s prior state of belief can influence updated 
beliefs. 
Even simple tasks such as modeling information gathering actions are beyond the 
scope of ELM update. Consider, for example, Moore’s [26] litmus test: the contents of 
a beaker a.re unknown and one dips litmus paper into it to determine if it is an acid or 
a base. The prior state of belief is captured by two possible worlds-in both of these 
worlds, the litmus papers is some neutral color (say, yellow), and in one the proposition 
acid holds, while in the other base is true. The color of the paper after the test action 
should rule out one of the possibilities. Unfortunately, the KM theory does not allow this 
to take place; the semantics of update requires that both prior possibilities be updated 
to reflect the observed color (e.g., blue). One is forced to accept that, if the contents 
were acidic (in which case it should turn red), some extraordinary change occurred (the 
test failed, the contents of the beaker were switched, etc.). Note that one cannot escape 
the dilemma by supposing there is IZO such transition, for postulate (U3) ensures that 
updating acid by blue is consistent [ 81. 
We can relax the KM update model to allow certain KB-worlds to be ruled out if 
the observation is not reachable through any “reasonable” transition from that world. 
This would dictate the addition of machinery to give a meaningful interpretation to the 
term “reasonable”. But we must go further. It may be that an observation “conflicts” 
with all KB-worlds. To continue the example, imagine the contents of the beaker are 
not unknown, but are believed to be acidic. If the test result is blue, the KM model 
requires the agent to postulate some (very unusual) transition from a world where the 
beaker contains an acid to a world where the paper is blue. Of course, the right thing 
to do is simply admit that the beaker did not, in fact, contain an acid-the agent should 
revise its beliefs about the contents of the beaker. In order to do this, we must extend 
the model of update to deal with structured or ranked belief sets so that we have some 
guidance for the revision of our beliefs. In general, belief change will involve certain 
aspects of both revision and update. 
3.2, Generalized update semantics 
Rather l:han generalizing the KM update semantics directly, we adopt the event-based 
approach Idescribed in Section 2.3. As above, we assume a set of events E. However, 
we allow these events to be nondeterministic, and each possible outcome of an event 
is ranked according to its plausibility. For example, an attempt to pick up a block will 
likely result in a world where the block is held, but occasionally will fail, leaving the 
agent empty-handed. 
Definition. 1. An event e maps each world into a (partial) K-ranking over worlds, 
e : W + ( W --) W). We use K,,~ to denote the ranking e(w). 
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Intuitively, K,,,(U) describes the plausibility that world u results when event e occurs 
at world w. We say v is a possible outcome of e at w iff K,,,(V) is defined (i.e., 
if K,,,(V) # 00). We call this evolution of w into v, under the specified event e, a 
transition, which we write w -& v. We note that since K,,,,~ is a K-ranking, we must 
have K~,~( v) = 0 for some v; that is, some outcome of event e must be most plausible. 
We occasionally assume the existence of the null event n, such that K,,,(W) = 0 and 
K~,~(v) = co if w # v. The null event ensures (with certainty) that the world does not 
change. 
As in the original event-based semantics, we will assume each world has an event 
ordering associated with it that describes the plausibility of various event occurrences at 
that world. 
Definition 2. An event ordering p maps each world into a (partial) K-ranking over the 
set of events E, ,u : W -+ (E -+ IV). We write K, to denote the ranking p(w) . 
To reiterate, I,,, captures the plausibility of the occurrence of event e at world w. 
Again, we assume K,+, is a partial function over E, with K,(e) = oo taken to mean that 
e cannot occur at w. We also note again that K,+,(e) = 0 for some e (i.e., some event is 
most plausible). 
Finally, we assume that an agent’s epistemic state, its beliefs about the current state 
of the world, are reflected in a straightforward K-ranking K over W. The plausibility 
accorded to world w is just K(W). These three components are put together to form a 
generalized update model. 
Definition 3. A generalized update model has the form M = (W, K, E, ,x), where W is 
a set of worlds, K is a K-ranking over W (the agent’s epistemic state), E is a set of 
events (mappings K,,~ over W) , and p is an event ordering (a set of mappings K, over 
E). We assume that K is the belief set induced by K. 
In summary, an agent must have information about the nature of the current state 
of world (K), what is likely to happen or not ( ,u), and the effects of those event 
occurrences (E) . Such models contain the information necessary to update K in response 
to an observation A; we denote the resulting belief set KS. We now describe the update 
process. 
To begin, we suppose that one “tick of the clock” has passed and that the agent must 
update its ranking K to reflect the possible occurrence of certain events, without the 
benefit of observation. Intuitively, the posterior plausibility of a world v depends on 
the plausibility of the transitions that lead to v. The plausibility of a transition w --% u 
depends on the plausibility of w, the likelihood that e occurred, and the likelihood of 
outcome v given w,e. In other words:7 
K(W%V) = K,,,(V) + Kw(e) + K(W). (1) 
’ We note that this formula is the qualitative analog of the probabilistic equation Pr( w A u) = Pr( ulw, e) 
Pr(elw) Pr(w) as described in Section 2.1. 
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With this in hand, an updated ranking KO can be given by 
K’(U) = ,G~i~~E{G+&J~ +&v(e) + K(W)} = wE@‘e’EE{K(WLU)}. 
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This epistemic state essentially captures the notion that the world has evolved one “step” 
but that the agent has no information about the nature of this transition (other than that 
contained in the model M). We note that the agent’s actual beliefs are determined by 
the minimlal worlds in K’ (i.e., those u such that KO (u) = 0). We sometimes refer to K’ 
as the anticipated or predicted updated ranking. 
As with KM update, updates usually occur in response to some observation, with 
the assumption that something occurred to cause this observation. After observing A an 
agent should adjust its beliefs by considering that only the most plausible transitions 
leading to A actually occurred. The set of possible A-transitions is: 
Tr(A) = {w&v 1 u + A and K(W%U) # co}. 
The most plausible A-transitions, denoted min( Tr( A) ) , are those possible A-transitions 
with the minimal K-ranking. Given that A has actually been observed, an agent should 
assume that one of these transitions describes the actual course of events. The worlds 
judged to be epistemically possible are those that result from the most plausible of these 
transitions,: 
resul,t( A) = {u 1w %U E min(Tr(A))}. 
Definition 4. Let K be the belief set determined by update model M. The generalized 
update of K by A (with respect to M) is 
Ki = {B 1 result(A) C /[B[l}. 
In other words, an agent updating by observation A believes what is true at the states 
that result from the most plausible A-transitions. 8 
This model views generalized update by A as the process of determining the most 
plausible ways in which A may have been brought about. It is not hard to see that 
the very same belief change operator is dictated by the process of first determining the 
predicted updated ranking K’ followed by (standard AGM) revision by A with respect 
t0 K”. 
Proposition 5. result(A) = min( A, K’) ; or, equivalently, 
Kz = {B I min(A, K”) C ~~B~~}. 
This conforms to our intuitions about the updating process: the direct update of K 
by A, Ki,, determines the same belief set as the process of first updating one’s entire 
epistemic state K to get KO, and then performing belief revision of K’ by the observation 
A. Loosely, we might say ( K”)T, = Ki. 
* Note that the exact form of o depends on the entire generalized update model M. To keep notation simple. 
we do not subscript the operator; the update model defining o should always be clear from context. 
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This notion of update naturally gives rise to the notion of an explanation for ob- 
servation A. We can view updating by A as a process of postulating the most likely 
explanations for A and adopting the consequences of these explanations as our new 
beliefs. Unlike update of unstructured belief sets, explanations must consider (and trade 
off) plausible initial conditions, events and event outcomes that lead to A. 
Definition 6. An explanation for A (given model M) is any triple (w, e, u) such that 
WC‘D E Tr(A) (which implies K(W~U) < cm). 
An explanation thus takes the form “It is possible that e occurred at w, leading to u 
and resulting in A.” Of course, many of these explanation can be highly implausible. 
Definition 7. The triple (w, e, ZJ) is a most plausible explanation for A iff w 2 u E 
min(Tr(A)). 
In other words, the most plausible explanations are those explanations with minimal 
K-ranking. 
If A is explainable (i.e., if the set of explanations is not empty), then the most 
plausible explanations correspond to the most plausible A-transitions: thus generalized 
update can be interpreted as an abductive process. Given observation A, we can determine 
our updated belief set by first finding the most plausible explanations for A, and then 
adopting the “consequences” of these explanations are our new belief set. It is simply 
the form of the explanation-“something was true, something occurred, and it had this 
outcome leading to observation A”-that is more complex than in many other forms 
of abduction. Note, however, that Proposition 5 means we are not required to generate 
explanations explicitly in order to produce the updated belief set. 
3.3. Examples 
Before considering the formal properties of this model, we illustrate its nature with two 
examples. To keep the treatment simple, in the first example we use only deterministic 
events, while in the second we assume a single nondeterministic event (the agent’s 
action). 
Fig. 3 illustrates the prior belief state of an agent who believes her book is on the patio 
and that both the grass and her book are dry. However, if her book is not on the patio, she 
believes she has left it inside (K(Znside( B) ) = 1). We omit other less plausible worlds. 
We assume three events: it might rain, the sprinkler might be turned on, or nothing 
happens (the null event). She judges K,( n&E) = 0, K,( ruin) = 1 and K, (sprinkler) = 
2, so ruin is more plausible than sprinkler (we assume a “global” ordering, suitable 
for all w). The outcomes of these events are deterministic-in particular, both rain and 
the sprinkler will make the grass wet, but the book will only get wet if it rains and 
it is on the patio. Now, if wet grass is observed, our agent will update her beliefs to 
accept Wet(G). A consequence of this is that she will now believe her book is wet: the 
most likely explanation is simply that it rained. If Wet(G) A Dry(B) are both observed 
(for instance, if she is told the book is safe), there are two most plausible posterior 
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,Inside(B) Dry(B) Wet(G) k=3 
Inside(B) Dry(B) Wet(G) 
Patio(B) Dry(B) Wet(G) 
k=2 
Patio(B) Wet(B) Wet(G) 
k=l 
kd Patio(B) Dry(B) Dry(G) Patio(B) Dry(B) Dry(G) k=O 
Fig. 3. Generalized update with multiple vents. 
worlds satisfying the observation (i.e., K( Wet(G) A Dry(B)) = 2). This corresponds 
to the existence of two plausible explanations: either the book is on the patio (K = 0) 
and the sprinkler turned on (K = 2); or the book is inside (K = 1) and it rained 
(K = 1). The result of this update on the agent’s state of belief is such that the agent 
is no longer sure where the book is. If we had instead set K(sprinkler) = 3, observing 
Mt( G) A O~J( B) would have caused the agent to believe that the book had been inside 
all along. The sprinkler explanation for the dry book becomes less plausible than having 
left the book inside. We see then that observing certain changes in the world can cause 
an agent to revise its beliefs about previous states of affairs. These revisions can impact 
on subsequent predictions and behavior (e.g., if the book is inside then so are her 
glasses). s’ 
A second example is shown in Fig. 4. We assume only one possible event (or action), 
that of dipping litmus paper in a beaker. The beaker is believed to contain either an 
acid or a base (K = 0) ; little plausibility (K = r) is accorded the possibility that it 
contains some other substance (say, kryptonite). The expected outcome of the test is a 
color change of the litmus paper: it changes from yellow to red if the substance is an 
acid, to blue if it is a base, and to green if it is kryptonite. However, the litmus test 
can fail some small percentage of the time, in which case the paper also turns green. 
This outcome is also accorded little plausibility (K = g). If the paper is dipped, and red 
is observed, the agent will adopt the new belief acid. Unlike KM update, generalized 
update permits observations to rule out possible transitions, or previously epistemically 
possible worlds. As such, it is an appropriate model for revision and expansion of 
beliefs due to information-gathering actions. An observed outcome of green presents 
two competing explanations: either the test failed (the substance is an acid or a base, 
9 The world satisfying Inside(B), Oy( B), Wet(G) at K = 3 is shown for illustration. Technically, that world 
has rank 1 since it occurs below, and the explanation “sprinkler and book inside” will never be adopted, 
unless further propositions and observations can distinguish the two worlds (e.g., other effects of the events 
in question). 
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and we still do not know which) or the beaker contains kryptonite. The most plausible 
explanation and the updated belief state depend on the relative magnitudes of g and r. 
The figure suggests that g < r, so the a test failure is most plausible and the belief 
acid V base is retained. If test failures are more rare (r < g), then this outcome would 
cause the agent to believe the beaker held kryptonite. 
4. Relationship to revision and update 
We now turn to the question of the relationship of GU to the classical AGM revision 
and KM update models. The analysis of the update postulates is in many ways similar 
to that presented in [8], where the simple event-based semantics of Section 2.3 was 
developed. There we showed that under certain assumptions this event-based operator 
satisfies the KM postulates, though we argued that these assumptions are not always 
appropriate. The key difference here is that the abductive approach has been generalized 
to allow ranked outcomes of events, and more importantly, ranked belief structures. This 
has surprisingly little impact on the analysis of the KM postulates-the basic models 
satisfy the same postulates and the same assumptions can be used to ensure satisfaction 
of addition postulates-with one significant exception: the postulate (US) becomes (in 
a certain sense) meaningless under GU. We elaborate on this below. 
We first note that our model satisfies a number of the KM postulates. 
Proposition 8. If o is the GU operator induced by some GU model then o satisfies 
postulates (Ul), (U4), (U5), (U6), (U7) and (U9). 
We note that GU satisfies the all of the same update postulates as the basic event- 
model for flat belief states [8]. 
One key difference between the GU model and the KM model is reflected in (U2), 
which asserts that KE% o A is equivalent to KEl whenever KB entails A. This cannot 
be the case in general, for even if KB b A, the most plausible event occurrence may 
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be something that changes another proposition while leaving A true. Observing A may 
simply mean that the change proceeded as expected. lo (U2) is appropriate only if we 
are willing to assume persistence of propositions, that changes (are believed to) occur 
only if evidence for them is observed. While appropriate in some settings, this is not a 
universal principle suitable for belief change. Nevertheless, we can model it by assuming 
inert updclte models, in which the null event is the most plausible in any situation. 
Definition 9. A GU model M = (W K, E, ,x) is inert if E contains the null event n and 
K;l(o) = {n} for all W E w. 
Proposition 10. If o is induced by an inert GU model then o satisfies (U2). 
The second key difference is reflected in the failure of (U3), which asserts that 
KB o A is satisfiable if A is. In our model, this corresponds to every A being explainable 
no matter what beliefs are held. GU models need not satisfy (U3). Consider the case 
where no event can result in an A-world (i.e., where Tr(A) = 0): the observation of A 
is then unexplainable, and Kj = LCPL, the inconsistent belief set. To prevent this, we 
can simply insist that every satisfiable sentence A is explainable. 
Definition 11. A GU model (u! K, E, p) is complete iff for any satisfiable A E LCPL, 
there are IV, u E W, e E E such that K(W) < co, Kw(e) < cm, K,,,Ju) < co and u k A. 
Proposition 12. If o is induced by a complete GU model then o satisfies (U3). 
In [S] we criticized (U3) as inappropriate for the update of flat belief sets. For 
example, if our beliefs corresponded to a single world where acid is believed, (U3) 
forces the observation of blue to behave quite poorly (as described above). However, 
such a maxim is much more reasonable in generalized update. It does not force one to 
propose wildly implausible transitions from prior epistemically possible states; instead 
one can re.vise one’s beliefs to account for the observation. In this case, we simply give 
up the belief acid. For this reason, (U3) may be seen as a reasonable postulate for GU, 
in which case we might take complete GU models to provide the appropriate semantic 
underpinn-ings for belief revision and update. 
There are a number of systematic ways in which one can enforce the condition of 
completeness such as requiring the existence of “miraculous” events that can cause 
anything [ 81. In our setting, one quite reasonable condition we might impose is that all 
worlds have some plausibility (i.e., K is a total function on W) and that the null event is 
possible (though not necessarily very plausible) at each of those. The first requirement 
is usually assumed of epistemic states (e.g., in the belief revision literature), and the 
second simply ensures that all worlds persist with some degree of plausibility. Thus 
while explanations of A may be implausible they will not be impossible. 
lo As an example, consider an assembly line monitor that observes a “status OK” signal. This may well 
already be believed; but the agent should still update its belief state by changing its belief about the number 
of parts that have been produced. 
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Finally, putting Propositions 8, 10, and 12 together we have: 
Theorem 13. lfo is induced by a complete, inert GU model then o satisjies (Ul)-( U7) 
and (U9). 
We note that the converse of this theorem and the preceding propositions is easy 
to verify, though not especially interesting. Primarily, we are interested in determining 
the nature of belief change given information about beliefs, events and event orderings, 
rather than the construction of models that corroborate arbitrary operators satisfying the 
postulates. We also note that our characterization theorem includes (U9) because of 
our use of K-rankings, which totally order events and worlds. One of the main reasons 
for using such rankings, as discussed in Section 2.1, is that they allow the scales of 
plausibility used to rank worlds, events and outcomes to be compared and added. In 
general, the use of qualitative ranking relations does not admit this flexibility unless 
one is willing to postulate a “metric” by which a combination of preorders can be 
compared. This is not a difficult task, but is somewhat more cumbersome than the 
approach provided here. Equivalent results should be obtainable in the more general 
setting of arbitrary preorders. 
There are two special cases of GU that are worth mentioning in passing. First, we note 
that “plain” KM update of unstructured belief sets is easily captured in our model by the 
simple restriction of K to rank worlds only as plausible (K = 0) or impossible (K = co). 
Second, reasoning about agent-controlled action (and observations) is also possible, as 
indicated in the litmus example. To do so, we simply view an agent’s actions as events: 
we associate with each action a a K-ranking K,,” that ranks outcomes of action a at 
world w. We take the key difference between actions and events (at least, as far as belief 
change is concerned) to be that actions are within the agent’s control so that it has direct 
knowledge of their occurrence. As such, actions need not be ranked according to their 
plausibility of occurrence, nor do they need to be postulated as part of an explanation. 
Observations can only be explained by supposing the action had a particular (perhaps 
unexpected) outcome, or by revising beliefs about the initial conditions, or both. ‘i 
To complete our analysis of the KM postulates, we turn our attention to (US). None of 
our characterization results involve (U8) because it cannot be enforced in a reasonable 
way in our model. The reason for this is our move to ranked models of epistemic states 
and our ability to explain (even “most plausibly” explain) an observation using initial 
conditions that conflict with our beliefs-that is, our ability to have observations revise 
our initial beliefs. 
(U8) is the only update postulate that relates the update of different initial states of 
belief, namely KBt , ICE%:! and KBt V KB2. For a given observation A, the update of KBi 
will generate a set of most plausible explanations w -% u, where u b A. Unfortunately, 
unless all of these explanations are such that w E 11 KBt 11, the properties of KBt o A are 
determined not only by KBt (together with the event model), but also by the ranking 
K that represents our initial epistemic state. Unless we impose strong and unnatural 
” Concurrent events and actions require special attention, however, and are beyond the scope of this paper. 
Our framework is certainly compatible with standard treatments of concurrency. 
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conditions on the relationships of the rankings K upon which our updates of KBt, KB2 
and KBt V KB2 are based, very little can be said about the relationship asserted by 
(U8). Indeed, we must allow update to proceed for the many distinct epistemic states 
K that determine a given knowledge base KB. 
We note that for a fixed event model (i.e., a fixed E and p), we calz relate the update 
of KB 1, ICI32 and KB 1 V KB:! under the following condition: the updated belief state 
K,j is a function of the initial belief state K (e.g., KBi, Kl32 or KBi V KB2) and not 
of the ranking K. If this is the case, it is easy to verify that (U8) will be satisfied. 
However, the only circumstance under which this condition will hold is if a categorical 
preference is given to explanations for A of the form w A u where w E 11 K(I. But 
this simply means that one is unwilling to revise ones prior beliefs to account for an 
observation. In other words, postulate (U8) only makes sense when we are dealing with 
jut, unstructured epistemic states-precisely the types of models whose weakness GU 
is designed to counteract! 
We wrap up by considering how AGM belief revision can be modeled in our frame- 
work. The common folklore states that belief revision is a form of belief change suitable 
when the world is static or unchanging. To verify this intuition, we propose static update 
models. 
Definition 14. An update model M = (K K, E, p) is static if E = {n} where 12 is the 
null event n. l2 
Assuming, as is usual in the belief revision literature, that K is a total function over 
W (i.e., K(W) < cc for all w E W), we obtain the following result: 
Theorem 15. If0 is induced by a static GU model then o satisjies (Rl)-(R8). 
Static event models have as the only possible transitions those of the form w --% w 
with plausibility K(W) . Thus, the informal intuition about belief revision (and the AGM 
model) can be verified formally: AGM revision is a particular form of GU suitable for 
a “static” system. (The converse of Theorem 15 is easily verified.) 
We note that the assumption of staticness is in fact much stronger than is needed to 
prove satisfaction of the AGM postulates. Indeed, simple inert models will satisfy this 
condition as well (as we see in Section 5.1) . The reason we consider static models to 
be the correct specialization of GU for modeling revision will become clear once we 
discuss iterated belief update in Section 5.1. 
5. Iterated belief update and observations 
The model we have described is strongly related to standard Bayesian models of 
belief update in stochastic dynamical systems. Roughly, in these models, an agent’s 
epistemic state is captured by a probability distribution. The probabilities associated 
I2 As above we assume K is a total function on W. 
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Fig. 5. The problem of iterated update. 
with various event occurrences and the outcomes of actions and events can be used in a 
Bayesian updating process to determine how to update this distribution given a specific 
observation. The updated distribution characterizes the agent’s updated epistemic state, 
which then may be subject to update given subsequent observations. 
While the connections to generalized update are quite strong, l3 there is one key 
difference: the stochastic dynamical system view shows how to produce an updated 
epistcbmic state, not just a simple belief state. The GU model, as described above, gives 
a characterization of the agent’s updated belief state in response to an observation. The 
belief state itself does not provide guidance for changes in belief due to subsequent 
observations. 
We address this problem, that of iterated belief change in this section. We first 
elaborate on the issues of iterated change and update of epistemic states. We then provide 
a short description of the basic partially observable, stochastic dynamical system model. 
Finally, we show how the intuitions of the quantitative dynamical system model can be 
captured in several different ways in our qualitative model (some of these being more 
direct than others). 
5.1. Iterated belief change 
To illustrate the need for a more elaborate specification of generalized update, we 
consider the raining example of Section 3.3. GU specifies that an agent with an epistemic 
state x given by the initial ranking in Fig. 3 and who observes Wet(G) will possess the 
belief state {Patio(B) , Wet(B) , Wet(G)}. This corresponds to the revision of the updated 
ranking K’ by the observation Wet(G) . Unfortunately, while it specifies an updated belief 
state, GU fails to dictate an updated epistemic state (see Fig. 5). Thus, the agent has no 
idea how to incorporate subsequent observations in general. For example, if the agent 
I3 Indeed, the equations defining an updated ranking and the belief state induced by a specific observation can 
be viewed as qualitative analogs of the quantitative r lations used for partially-observable stochastic dynamical 
systems. This will become apparent below. 
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now observes Dry(B), it requires a legitimate epistemic state (e.g., a ranking) in order 
to revise or update this new belief state to account for the new observation. With only 
the basic belief state in its possession, the new observation is simply inconsistent, unless 
there is some miraculous book drying event. 
We note that this problem is strongly related to the problem of iterated belief revision: 
given an epistemic state and an observation by which an agent’s beliefs are to be revised, 
how should this epistemic state change (not just the belief state). It has been observed 
by a number of authors that the AGM theory of revision has little to say in this respect 
[23,27]. As a result, a number of proposal for extending theories of belief revision 
to dictate revised rankings or epistemic states have been proposed [ 5,9,11,31,32]. In 
fact, it is the “revision component” of GU (as opposed to the “update component”) 
that fails to adequately characterize the required change in epistemic state. This can be 
seen clearly in Fig. 5: the model of the system dynamics allows one to update the entire 
ranking, while the revision of the updated ranking simply produces a belief set. Thus, a 
reasonable theory of belief revision, that specifies how one should revise an epistemic 
state, will automatically dictate how to apply GU to epistemic states. 
We will describe several methods of effecting iterated revision (and, in particular, 
revision of epistemic states) within the GU framework below. In particular, two models 
of iterated revision within the theory of K-rankings, as developed by Spohn [ 3 I] (and 
further investigated by Goldszmidt and Pearl [ 18,19]), can be applied almost directly 
to GU. However, the application of these techniques to GU can be better motivated 
by illustrating the connections of GU to stochastic dynamical systems, which we do 
in the next section. We note that in a purely qualitative setting (with a relation < 
of relative plausibility replacing a ranking function K), iterated revision is especially 
problematic. I4 However, at least one of the models developed below can be applied in 
such a setting. 
Before proceeding with our account of iterated GU, we pause to reflect on the new 
light shed on Theorem 15, the relationship of GU and belief revision, by this view of 
iterated revision. Theorem 15 shows that if our GU-model is static (i.e., if the null 
event is the only plausible event), then GU will satisfy the eight AGM postulates for 
belief revision. The intuitions underlying such static models are clear, and are illustrated 
graphically in Fig. 6(a): the update portion of GU leaves the ranking unaltered, thus 
allowing the revision component to proceed on the original ranking. 
However, because of the weakness of the AGM postulates, the conditions of The- 
orem 15 are much stronger than necessary. For example, suppose we have an inert 
model, one where the null event is more plausible than other events (see Fig. 6(b)). 
In such a model, other events can occur, but some “preference” is given to explanations 
of observations that require no changes in the world. Due to the fact that the AGM 
theory does not impose strong restrictions on the form of updated rankings, we have the 
following result: 
Proposition 16. If o is induced by an inert GU model then o satisfies (Rl )-( R8). 
I4 For a discussion of some of the difficulties, see [7,9,11,23 1 
302 C. Boutilier/ArtQicial Intelligence 98 (1998) 281-316 
Fig. 6. Iterated revision with (a) Static and (b) inert GU models. 
Intuitively, the only requirement of the AGM postulates is that the agent’s epistemic 
state is characterized by some ranking in which worlds consistent with its beliefs form 
the set of most plausible worlds. In Fig. 6(b) we can see that the update portion of GU 
preserves the agent’s belief state, just like a static model. This means that the revision 
portion of GU will satisfy the AGM postulates with respect to the original belief state. 
Unfortunately, the inert model, unlike the static model, can shift the relative plausibility 
of all worlds other than those with rank 0. This means that generalized update by an 
observation that is not consistent with the agent’s original belief set does not generally 
produce the same belief set that would be obtained by straightforward revision with 
respect to the original ranking. 
Although the AGM postulates are satisfied, we should not consider “inert generalized 
update” to be the “special case” of GU corresponding to revision. Since the model 
is not truly static, one can produce truly bizarre results that we would not expect of 
belief revision. For instance, given an initial belief set K, it is quite possible with an 
inert model that Kz is very different from (KT):. In other words, updating by a null 
observation followed by A can result in a different belief set than updating immediately 
by A. This is, of course, not surprising, given that the world can change. It is, however, 
surprising that it should satisfy the AGM postulates if these postulates are intended to 
characterize revision in static environments. Again, we emphasize that this is due to the 
fact that the AGM theory says nothing substantial about iterated revision or the revision 
of epistemic states. 
We note that recent proposals for dealing with iterated revision (e.g., see Boutilier’s 
MC-revision model [9], or the postulates of Darwiche and Pearl [ 1 I]) all insist that 
revision by T not affect the agent’s epistemic state. It is clear that an inert model does 
not satisfy this requirement. However, static models do. Thus we legitimize the claim 
that, in fact, static GU models exactly capture the intuitions underlying belief revision, 
and formally verify the conventional wisdom that belief revision corresponds to belief 
change about static environments. 
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5.2. Stochtzstic dynamical systems and GU 
We begin with a very brief description of a simple model of a partially observable, 
stochastic dynamical system. I5 As above, a system can be in a number of possible 
states S. If The system dynamics can be characterized by two families of probabilities 
functions. Event probabilities refer to the probability of a particular event occurring at 
a given state: Pr(els) refers to the probability of e occurring in state s. I7 Outcome 
probabilith capture the probability of a particular state t resulting from the occurrence 
of an event e at state s, and are denoted Pr( tls, e). 
An agent’s epistemic state is represented by a distribution over states, Prk( s) denoting 
the agent’s degree of belief that the system is in state s at time k. The agent can update 
its distribution using its model of the dynamics as follows: 
Prk+lCt) = y yzPrk(s) Pr(els) Pr(tls, e). 
eEE sES 
(3) 
This corresponds to the agent’s predications about how the system will evolve in one 
“clock tick”. 
In order to account for observations the agent might make of the system state, we 
assume an observation model: we have a set of possible observations 0 together with 
a family of distributions Pr( 01s) representing the probability of making an observation 
o E 0 when the true system state is s. I8 When an agent makes an observation o at 
time k + 1, we can view the change of its epistemic state as a two-stage process: first, it 
updates its distribution to form Prk+r as above; second, it conditions this distribution on 
the observation o to obtain Pri,,. This second phase can be computed using a simple 
application of Bayes Rule: 
pr(ob) Ekfl (s) 
R’+l”s) = x,Pr(o(t) P&+](t)’ 
We now turn our attention to the relationship between GU and this model of belief 
update in stochastic dynamical systems. We first note that straightforward predictive 
update, the updating of a ranking, follows exactly the same “rules” as the update of 
a probability distribution, the distinction being that qualitative probabilities (“kappa?) 
are used in GU. In particular, Eq. (2) is precisely the qualitative analog of Eq. (3). 
Accounting for observations is not quite so straightforward. The assumption under- 
lying all work in belief revision and update, including the GU model as presented, 
is that the agent observes propositions directly. Unlike the standard dynamical system 
model, observations are actually part of the state (i.e., a proposition that is deter- 
mined by the state). This makes it difficult to deal with fallible or “noisy” observations 
I5 The interested reader can consult [3,10,24,25,30] for more detailed models, discussions of control, etc. 
“We will use the term “state” in the context of stochastic dynamical systems, and “world” when discussing 
GU. 
I7 Technically, Pr(els) is not a conditional probability, but a distribution over E as a function of s, Prs(e). 
We use this notation for its suggestiveness and familiarity. (Similarly for Pr(rls, e) defined below.) 
‘s In more general models, one can allow the observation to depend on state transitions or on the action taken 
by the agent. Such complications are not germane to the discussion here. 
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(though not impossible-see Section 5.3). In order to account for such determinis- 
tic observations, we will specialize the dynamical system model by assuming that 
each state dictates precisely the observation that will be made. In other words, we 
assume that Pr(ojs) = 1 if s k o and Pr(o]s) = 0 if s v u. In order to make 
sense of this, we must consider the proposition or variable that the agent is attempt- 
ing to observe, otherwise there is no reason the agent cannot observe the entire state. 
Therefore, we make a tacit assumption that an agent explicitly acts to observe the 
truth value of a particular proposition. This action does not change the world in 
any way (it is a null event), but tells the agent whether the proposition is true or 
false. l9 We will relax the assumption that this observation process is infallible in Sec- 
tion 5.3. 
With this deterministic observation model in hand, we note that updating by Bayes 
Rule in Eq. (4) simplifies to simple conditioning by the observation o. In other words, 
i 
Prk+l(s) 
Prg+,(s) = Ct{Rk+l Ct> I t + u, if ’ ’ ” (5) 
0 if s #0. 
Generalized update can be used to produce a new K-ranking by conditioning in an 
entirely analogous way. Recall that K’ refers to the updated ranking before revision by 
the operation (as defined by Eq. (2) ) . We define 
K;(W) = 
K”(W) - KO(A) if w b A, 
00 ifw#A. 
(6) 
This process of conditioning (in a static context) is described in [ 191. Intuitively, 
the agent’s initial ranking is updated, then the observation A is applied to the updated 
ranking by removing all YA-worlds (the remaining worlds are normalized by subtracting 
K’ (A) so that a legitimate ranking results). We dub this process infallible GU because 
all observations are treated as being certain. The process of infallible GU naturally lends 
itself to iteration, since generalized update by an observation A results in an updated 
ranking. The result of infallible update by the observation Wet(G) in the rain example is 
illustrated in Fig. 7. We note that conditioning is an especially simple form of updating 
an epistemic state in response to an observation. It can be be applied directly to purely 
qualitative ranking in the obvious way. 
5.3. Noisy observations in GU 
The key difficulty with the infallible model of GU, in other words, conditioning 
directly on observed propositions, is the assumption that propositions in the domain are 
directly observable without error. For instance, given the infallible update by Wet(G) in 
the previous example, an agent cannot subsequently meaningfully update his epistemic 
‘gSuch actions might take the form of Scherl and Levesque’s [28] sell~ep actions. This action returns an 
observation of the form P or YP for a particular proposition P. This is the sense in which states “determine” 
observations (relative to a given sensing action). 
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Fig. 7. Conditioning and infallible generalized update. 
state by the observation Dry(G) unless there is an explaining event that immediately 
causes the grass to dry. In no way will an explanation of Dry(G) include the possibility 
that the earlier observation was incorrect. 
One can deal with this difficulty in a rather obvious way: simply add propositions 
to the domain that refer to the observations that have been or can be made by the 
agent. The fact that an observation of the proposition K%t( G) is fallible can be modeled 
by relating the conditional degree of belief a proposition describing the observation 
(say &M&G) to the proposition itself. For instance, an agent’s epistemic state might 
reflect the fact that any state in which Wet(G) A obsWetG holds is more plausible 
than the corresponding world satisfying Wet(G) A obsDryG (e.g., by some amount 
K( obsDryG1 Wet( G) ) ). In this sense, while conditioning by the observation obsWetG 
does preclude the fact that you might have made observation obsDryG, it does not 
rule out the possibility Dry(G) ; it merely makes it less plausible. Of course, in order 
to fully develop this model of conditioning by observations, we would be forced to 
deal with time in some way or another. For example, conditioning on obsWetG rules 
out any worlds in which obsDryG is true. However, one could subsequently make a 
contradictory observation of dry grass. In order to condition on this new observation, 
we would require a different (but related) proposition that refers to obsDryG at the next 
point in time. *’ We could, for instance, use time-stamped observational propositions. In 
order to specify such a model in a convenient way, we would have to develop additional 
machinery. We do not pursue this here, though it could be developed in a less awkward 
fashion in the run-based model of Friedman and Halpern [ 121 (which is described 
below). 
2o A distinct observational proposition is necessary, since conditioning on obsWetG removes all worlds where 
obsDryG holds. Subsequent conditioning on obsDryG would result in inconsistent beliefs. 
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Instead, we will present a second alternative, based directly on standard stochas- 
tic observation models. We assume that there exists a set of observations 0 that are 
related in a nondeterministic way to possible worlds. The observation model p de- 
scribes the plausibility of various observations in different world states. Formally, p : 
W + (0 + N) maps worlds into K-rankings over the observation set. The ranking 
p(w) describes how likely the agent is to observe a given o E 0 in world w. We 
write ~(01~) for p(w) (0). As usual, for each w, there is at least one o such that 
K(OIW) = 0. 
Once again, we do not assume that an observation is dictated solely by the true state 
of the world, but is influenced by the observation action taken by the agent. For instance, 
if the agent executes an “observe grass” action, the appropriate observation set might be 
{obsWetG, obsDryG}, and the observation model might be specified as follows: 
K(obsWetGIWet(G)) = 0; K(obsDryGIWet(G)) = 2; 
K(obsWetGlDry(G)) = 3; K(obsDryGIDry(G)) = 0. 21 
To keep the presentation a bit simpler, we suppress any conditioning of observation 
models on the observational action being taken, especially since this impacts little on 
the development (and the extension is obvious). We simply assume that an appropriate 
observation is (actively or passively) obtained by some means. 
With this model of “fallible” observations, we can extend GU to a form of fallible 
generalized update much as we did to obtain infallible GU. To do this we will use the 
analog of Eq. (4) directly (recall, that in the infallible/conditioning case, this application 
of Bayes Rule reduced to the simpler form given by Eq. (5)). Recall that K’ refers 
to the updated ranking before revision by the operation (as defined by Eq. (2)). We 
define, for any observation A: 
K”,(W) = K(AIw) + K’(W) - KO(A). 
We note that the last term reflects the absolute plausibility of making observation A and 
is delined as: 
K(A) = t$n{+) + ~(Alu)}. 
Intuitively, this model does precisely what one expects: given an observation A, each 
world becomes more or less plausible according to the degree to which it gives rise 
to A. Worlds for which A is expected (~(Alw) = 0) keep the same relative rank, 
while worlds for which A is unexpected (~(Alw) = k > 0) become less plausible 
by the degree k to which A was surprising. Finally, the normalization term K(A) is 
subtracted to ensure that an appropriate ranking (with minimal elements having rank 0) 
is obtained. We note that if observations are deterministic, or embedded in the world 
state description, then Eq. (7) reduces exactly to Eq. (6) and is nothing more than 
conditioning. 
*’ This method of specification summarizes the observation model; e.g., K(obsWetGIWet(G)) = 0 means that 
K(obsWetGlw) = 0 for all w k Wet(G). 
C. Boutilier/ArtiJicial Intelligence 98 (I998) 281-316 307 
[ @ Kryp Green 1 k=2 
k=l 





Fig. 8. Uncertain observations and fallible generalized update. 
To illustrate the process, consider the litmus example of Fig. 4. Now imagine that 
observations of color are imperfect, so that false readings are implausible to degree 2; 
that is, K( obsColorZlCulor2) is 0 if the true color and observed color are the same, and 
is 2 if they are different. The result of fallible update by the observation obsGreen given 
this observation model is illustrated in Fig. 8. 
We note that this model of noisy observations cannot be used, at least in its full 
generality, in a purely qualitative setting (though see remarks in Section 7). A key 
element of the observation model is the ability to specify that certain observations occur 
with varying degrees of plausibility, and the ability to compare (and combine) the 
degrees of plausibility accorded to particular worlds by an observation with their prior 
degrees of plausibility. 
Finally, we point out a third way in which noisy observations can be incorporated, 
through the use of strength of evidence. In the original development of K-functions, 
Spohn [ 3 1 ] does not emphasize conditioning by observations, but a-conditioning, where 
a proposition A is observed with a certain (integer) strength LY. Intuitively, the relative 
plausibility of all A-worlds is shifted by (Y (so that if (Y is positive, A becomes more 
plausible). This process is dubbed J-conditioning in [ 191 (as it is exactly analogous to 
Jeffrey conditioning of a probability distribution). In [ 191 a similar process known as 
L-conditio,rting is also proposed, whereby A does not become a degrees more plausible, 
but A is made to plausible to degree LY. 
Instead ‘of having an explicit observation model, one could directly observe proposi- 
tions in the domain, and account for the uncertainty of these observations by attaching 
strengths to them. In this way, instead of direct conditioning by A (and its attendant 
difficulties), J-conditioning or L-conditioning may be used. We do not pursue this sug- 
gestion helre; the reader is referred to [ 19,311 for details of this type of conditioning. 
The application of these ideas to GU is straightforward. However, a key question that 
arises is the following: how does one determine the strength of an observation? The 
obvious answer is that one must have an observation model. For this reason, we find 
the model of fallible generalized update to be the most compelling of qualitative belief 
change in dynamic settings. 
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6. Related work 
6.1. Trajectory-based semantics 
There are a number of ideas that have directly influenced the generalized update 
model, including the work cited above on belief revision, belief update, K-rankings, 
iterated revision, reasoning about action and dynamical systems. However, there have 
been few attempts to tie all of these ideas together in a comprehensive, qualitative 
framework. There is one framework in which belief update and belief revision can 
both be expressed, namely, the run-based (or trajectory-based) model of Friedman and 
Halpern [ 121. This model is similar to ours, especially in its general outlook on revision 
and update and its adoption of a dynamical systems perspective. 
In the run-based framework, an agent imposes a qualitative plausibility relation (serv- 
ing the role of a K-function) not over possible worlds, but on possible system trajectories 
or histories. Each trajectory corresponds to a sequence of transitions, or states the world 
might have passed through. The relative plausibility of a trajectory captures the degree 
to which an agent thinks that trajectory might be (or has been) realized. When an 
observation is made at a particular point in time, a normal belief revision process can be 
applied. The most plausible trajectories after revision by a particular observation make 
up the agent’s new belief state. As such, an agent can have beliefs that extend over time. 
Friedman and Halpern also show that under certain assumptions belief change in this 
model satisfies the revision postulates and under certain assumptions satisfies the KM 
update postulates. 
One impediment to the use of a trajectory-based model is determining an initial rank- 
ing of entire trajectories. While Friedman and Halpern do not emphasize this point, it is 
clear that the individual (state-to-state) transitions within a trajectory should correspond 
to the occurrence of events within the system, and that the (initial) relative plausibility 
of a trajectory should simply be a function of the (prior) plausibility of its initial state 
and the plausibilities of the individual event occurrences along the trajectory (together 
with the plausibility of the corresponding event outcomes). In this respect, it is easy to 
see how GU can be embedded in the Friedman-Halpern model. The distinctions lie in 
emphasis: we focus on the source of trajectory plausibilities as a function of individual 
events, actions, or their outcomes, while Friedman and Halpern emphasize the relative 
plausibility of entire trajectories. 
Viewed in this light we can also see some of the technical assumptions implicit in the 
GU model. First, our observation and system dynamics models treat the plausibility of 
observations, events and event/action outcomes as a function of world state; the actual 
history an agent has passed through does not influence the agent’s estimate of action 
outcome or observation likelihoods. Thus, we are making the Markovian assumption: 
dynamics are independent of history. For this to provide an accurate model of a domain, 
our states or worlds must contain enough information to render predictions of the future 
independent of the past. This is generally not very restrictive, and is the assumption 
underlying almost all work in AI on planning and reasoning about action. However, 
the trajectory-based model is more general in this respect. Non-Markovian systems are 
easily representable in the Friedman-Halpern model. Furthermore, we have made an 
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assumption of stutionarity: the system dynamics and observation model do not change 
over time. Again, while this assumption is relatively uncontroversial, the Friedman- 
Halpern model can very easily deal with nonstationary systems. 
We note that in subsequent work [ 141, Friedman and Halpern address the difficulty 
of associating plausibility with entire trajectories and come to precisely the same con- 
clusions: the Markovian and stationarity assumptions are very natural and provide great 
leverage in specifying system dynamics (and for their model, easily allow one to deter- 
mine the plausibility of trajectories). The assumptions that frameworks for qualitative 
belief change, like GU and the Friedman-Halpern system, show to be effective in mod- 
eling belief change are exactly those that have been adopted in the dynamical systems 
community for years. Finally, we note that Geffner [ 161 has recently developed a model 
for reasoning about action using the K-calculus to represent the defeasibility of action 
effects. By making the Markov assumption explicit, he uses this model to determine the 
plausibility of system trajectories. 
To illustrate the power of GU (as well as the implications of assumptions such as 
Markovian dynamics), we consider the stolen or borrowed car problem. 22 The setting 
is as folla’ws: you arrive at a very expensive restaurant, and leave your very expensive 
car with the valet to be parked. At the end of the evening you pick up your car from 
the parking lot and begin to drive home. A few miles later, you notice that the odometer 
reading is extremely high (say 50 miles higher than when you arrived at the restaurant; 
it is a very expensive car and you are obsessive about the mileage!). How will your 
belief state change? 
Intuitively, what we are after in this example is the explanation that the valet took 
your car out for a joyride while you were eating. To see how this might arise, we 
consider an event model in which there are several possible events, including the null 
event (where your car stays put), the steal event (where your car is stolen from the 
lot), and the joyride event (where your car is borrowed by the valet for some period 
of time). Furthermore, we might have some estimate of the length of time for which 
the valet rnight borrow the car, which could be modeled using a return event (the valet 
returns the car to the lot). One possible event model is illustrated in Fig. 9, along with 
an initial belief state in which you are certain the car is in the lot with low mileage. 
We consider several possible observations and updates of epistemic state one could 
make. Suppose at time 1 you unexpectedly return to the parking lot to pick up the car and 
find it missing. The most plausible explanation is the steal event, and you will believe the 
car has been stolen (as well, the mileage is high). If you make no such observation at 
time 1 (e.g., any observation actions taken-see Section 5.2 and 5.3-were unrelated to 
these propositions), then any of the models of GU that deal with iteration (as presented 
in Section 5) wiil leave you in the epistemic state (and associated belief state) given 
by the ranking at time 1. 
Suppose you try to pick up the car at time 2 and find the car missing (that is, not 
parked). The most plausible explanation is that the car was stolen (but note there is 
no preference as to when the car was stolen, at time 0 or time 1). If the car is still in 
22 The borrowed car problem is developed by Friedman and Halpem in their trajectory-based model, but the 
example is attributed to the author. The related stolen car problem is due to Kautz [ 221. 
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Fig. 9. The borrowed or stolen car problem. 
T3 
the lot, and you observe Parked, you will assume that nothing strange has happened. 
Should you also observe that the mileage is High at time 2, then you have no choice 
but to conclude that the car was joyridden and returned. 23 
Suppose, now, that after returning at time 2 to find the car parked (but not yet 
observing the mileage), you begin to drive home and notice High halfway home, at 
time 3. Your belief at time 2 that nothing unusual happened is now revised: again 
you must believe that the car was joyridden at time 0 at returned at time 1. Note 
that this event model asserts that if a car is being joyridden, the most likely event 
is the return of the car, with a continuation of the ride being unlikely. If you had 
found the car missing at time 2, and for some reason were convinced that it was not 
stolen, the most plausible explanation would be that it was joyridden at time 1, not 
at time 0: had it been taken at time 0, it would most likely have been returned by 
now. Thus, unlike the explanations of a stolen car (where no preference for the time of 
stealing is given), the joyride explanation comes with a preference for a more recent 
ride. This is due solely to the fact that our model of the process implicitly provides 
a duration. Should continue be just as likely as return, this chronological preference 
would disappear. 
It is worthwhile to point out some of the demands made by the Markov and stationarity 
assumptions in an example like this. Note that we have added propositions like joyridden 
and stolen to the description of the world. In a certain sense, these propositions encode 
the history of past events. As such, we do not need to keep track of history explicitly, but 
only the relevant bits of history that we decide to represent in our propositional language. 
23 To keep the diagram simple, we have “folded in” the effect of the “return to pick up car” action with the 
effects of the other actions (e.g., it causes InCar to hold if the car is present). 
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This makes a model based on epistemic states about the “current” state of affairs more 
attractive than a trajectory-based model: history can be accounted for, but one has the 
option of distinguishing only relevant historical facts as opposed to considering arbitrary 
distinctions between entire trajectories. 
6.2. Distance-based semantics 
Recently, a model of belief revision based on a distance semantics was proposed [ 291. 
Roughly, we assume the existence of a metric d over W that specifies the “distance” 
between possible worlds. Intuitively, d(w, u) reflects the degree of difficulty or cost 
to change from situation w to u. One key assumption is that d( w, u) is minimum 
exactly when w = v. Given a belief set K, and an observation A, those A-worlds closest 
(according to d) to some element of llK[l d e ermine the set Kz. Since d is fixed, this t 
model allows for iteration as well. 
It is shown in [29] that, under certain assumptions, such a semantics is equivalent 
to the AGM model of revision (that is, it satisfies the AGM postulates, and can rep- 
resent any operator that satisfies the postulates). In one sense, this result may seem 
surprising, for the intuitions underlying the semantics are much like that of update 
semantics. Indeed, we might view the basic GU semantics as providing a distance met- 
ric that can be used in this regard: we can take d (w, v) to be the plausibility of the 
most plausible transition from w to v. Under the assumption of inertness described 
in Section 5.1, we can see that d( w, w) (for any w) is minimum. Of course, it was 
just this inertness assumption that allowed us to show that GU satisfied the AGM 
postulates (Proposition 16). However, as we argued there, this assumption is not the 
correct way to think about belief revision (as opposed to update). That it satisfies the 
AGM postulates is a sign of the weakness of these postulates, not of the suitability 
of inert models as a semantics for revision. As a result, the fact that a distance se- 
mantics can be made to satisfy the postulates does not mean revision can be thought 
of productively in these terms. We do note that distances do play a role in belief up- 
date however; we can view the relative plausibility of transitions as a form of distance 
between worlds. 24 
7. Concluding remarks 
We have provided a model for generalized belief update that extends both the classical 
update and revision models, combining the crucial aspects of both, and retaining both 
as special cases. The main feature of GU is its insistence one be allowed to both revise 
and updat.e one’s beliefs about the world in response to an observation. In addition, 
we have .provided an abductive interpretation of update as the process of explaining 
observations in terms of what was initially true, what event or action may have occurred 
and the outcome that event may have had. We presented a model for dealing with noisy 
observations in belief revision, treating a problem that has been virtually ignored in 
24 Distances of this type are, however, not generally symmetric. 
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the belief revision and reasoning about action communities. Finally, we have shown the 
strong connections between the GU model (especially as augmented with observation 
models) and the well-understood models of stochastic dynamical systems. Indeed, GU 
can be viewed as a qualitative form of Bayesian update, with the K-calculus playing the 
role of probabilistic laws. 
In this paper, we have focused exclusively on the semantics of generalized update. 
Appropriate representation languages for the concise expression of events (with defea- 
sible effects), defeasible beliefs and other aspects of the model must still be developed. 
The specification language proposed by Geffner [ 161 would seem to be a useful way 
of representing the system dynamics component of a GU model. Many of the other 
components of such languages are already in place, based primarily on conditional 
and dynamic logics, and other languages for actions and defeasible beliefs. However, 
a number of details regarding compact and natural representation languages and their 
feasibility are sure to require some subtlety. This undertaking is especially important 
when the ability to reason about incompletely specified systems is required. 
One issue that has remained unexplored to a large extent is that of revising beliefs 
about system dynamics (event and outcome plausibilities). The GU model supposes 
that events and outcomes are specified independently of an agent’s beliefs, and that 
the dynamics of the system in question are fixed and known. The same holds true 
for an agent’s observation model. In general, however, one might expect an agent to 
have beliefs about these entities which are themselves subject to revision. While not 
inconsistent with our model, a more elaborate treatment requires a language in which 
(defeasible) beliefs about events, outcomes, and so on can be expressed. 
One final stumbling block to a general treatment of qualitative belief change has to 
do with purely ranked models in which K-like ranking information is not available. The 
K values of different worlds and events provided us with a direct means of determining 
(for instance) the relative plausibility of various transitions by permitting the addition 
of the component KS. Models based on pure ranking information, without quantitative 
degrees of belief, are often used in belief revision (see, for instance, the semantics for 
AGM revision given in [ 6,201 or the plausibility measures of [ 131) . To compare the 
relative plausibility of transitions in such a setting, we must have a way of trading off 
the relative likelihoods of initial conditions, events, event outcomes, and so forth. Simple 
ranking information does not allow one to do so; direct judgements of the plausibility 
of these combinations must be made. A more general qualitative theory would do 
just that-an example of such a theory is the plausibility measure approach recently 
proposed in [ 141. The K-approach presented here is a special case of this more general 
model. However, the essential spirit of such a proposal is identical to that underlying 
our presentation. 
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Appendix. A. Proofs of main results 
Proposition 5. resuZt( A) = min( A, K’) ; or, equivalently, 
Kz = {B ) min(A,~‘) G jjB11). 
Proof. This follows almost immediately from the definitions of resuZt( A) and K’. If 
Tr( A) = $1 then resuZt( A) = 8 and min( A, K’) = 8. Otherwise, 
min(A, K’) = {u 1 W&U E min(Tr(A))} = result(A). 0 
Proposition 8. If o is the GU operator induced by some GU model then o satisfies 
postulates (Ul), (U4), (U5), (U6), (U7) and (U9). 
Proof. Assume an event model M = (W; K, E, p) and associated update operator o (for 
simplicity we drop the subscript). We show in turn that each of these postulates is 
satisfied. 
(Ul) Eiy definition, result(A) C_ llA]l. Immediately we have KB o A k A. 
(U4) Suppose + A = B. Then Tr(A) = Tr(B) and result(A) = resuZt( B). Thus, 
KBoA=:KBoB. 
(U5) Let w 5 u be a most plausible A-transition such that u k B. (If no such 
u exists, (KE3 o A) A B is unsatisfiable and (U5) holds trivially.) Clearly, w A u 
is a most plausible A A B-transition, since a strictly more plausible A A B-transition 
(which is an A-transition) contradicts the fact that w -% u is most plausible. Thus, 
result(A) n llBl[ L resuZt(AAB) and(KESoA)ABkKE%o(AAB). 
(U6) Suppose KB o A k B and KB o B k A. Then we have resuZt( A) z llB[l and 
result(B) C IlAll. If u E resuZt( A), there must exist a most plausible A-transition of the 
form w --L u (where u k A). However, since u E II BII, w -& u is a B-transition as 
well. If w 5 u $ min(Tr( B)), there must exist a most plausible B-transition w’ e’ u’ 
such that K( w’ e’ v’) < K( w L u) ; but since resuZt( B) C [[All, this contradicts the 
fact that ‘w L u E min(Tr( A) ). Hence, u E resuZt( B) and resuZt( A) c resuZt( B). A 
similar argument shows resuZt( B) c resuZt( A); hence KB o A = KB o B. 
(U7) !Suppose u E resuZt( A) n resuZt( B). (If there is no such u then (KB o A) A 
(KB o B) is inconsistent and (U7) holds trivially.) Then there is some e such that 
w 5 u is a most plausible A-transition and a most plausible B-transition. This ensures 
that w A+ u is a most plausible A V B-transition and that u E resuZt( A V B). Hence, 
resuZt(A)nresuZt(B) c resuZt(AVB). Therefore, (KBoA)A(KBoB) k KBo(AVB). 
(Note that this proof does not require that KB be complete, in contrast to the conditions 
put on (IJ7) in the KM postulates.) 
(U9) Let KE3 be complete with [IKBll = {w}. Suppose KBoA kc: TB and KBoA k C. 
Then result(A) C_ llCl[ and resuZt(A)nllBII f 8. N ow if v E resuZt( AAB), then w L v 
must be ,a most plausible A-transition (since u + A and any less plausible transition 
is dominated by w e’u’ for some u’ E result(A) n 11Bll). Hence, resuZt(A A B) c 
result(A) n llBl[ C llCl[ and KBo(AA B) b C. 0 
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Proposition 10. If o is induced 6y an inert GU model then o satisfies (U2). 
Proof. Assume that A4 = (W, K, E, ,CL) is an inert model, inducing update operator o (for 
simplicity we drop the subscript). Suppose KB k A. Then {w * w 1 w E IIKBII} forms 
the set of most plausible A-transitions (where n is the null event). Thus result(A) = 
ljKBl[ and KB o A is equivalent to KB; (U2) is satisfied. 0 
Proposition 12. If o is induced by a complete GU model then o satis$es (U3). 
Proof. Assume that M = (W; K, E, ,x) is an inert model, inducing update operator o (for 
simplicity we drop the subscript). Since M is complete, any satisfiable A is explainable 
(i.e., Tr(A) # 0). So if KB is satisfiable, result(A) # 8 and KB o A is satisfiable; 
(U3) is satisfied. 0 
Theorem 15. rf o is induced by a static GU model then o satisfies (Rl )-(R8). 
Proof. Let M = (K K, E, ,u) be a static model, inducing update operator o (for simplicity 
we drop the subscript). Since M is static, we have K = KO (i.e., the predicted updated 
ranking is identical to the original). By Proposition 5, 
Ki = {B / min(A, KO) C ~~ll~~}. 
Thus 
Kz = {B I min(A,fc) C ~~B~~}. 
The standard AGM representation results for K-rankings ensure the revision postulates 
are satisfied. (Note: we assume that K is total; i.e., K(W) < 00 for all w.) 0 
Proposition 16. If0 is induced by an inert GU model then o satisfies (RI)-(R8). 
Proof. Let M = (u! K, E, ,u) be an inert model, inducing update operator o (for sim- 
plicity we drop the subscript). By Proposition 5, 
Kz = {B I min(A, K’) 2 ~~B~~}. 
The fact that M is inert ensures that min( KO) = min( K) (i.e., the most plausible 
worlds-those determining the belief set K-are identical in the original and updated 
rankings). Since for any K (and induced K), the updated ranking K’ is a revision 
model for K, the standard AGM representation results ensure the revision postulates are 
satisfied. (Note: we assume that K is total; i.e., K(W) < ca for all w.) 0 
References 
[ 11 E.W. Adams, The Logic of Conditionals (Reidel, Dordrecht, 1975). 
[2] C. Alchour&, P. Giirdenfors and D. Makinson, On the logic of theory change: partial meet contraction 
and revision functions, J. Symbolic Logic 50 ( 1985) 510-530. 
C. Boutilier/Artijicial Intelligence 98 (1998) 281-316 315 
[3] K.J. Astrom, Optimal control of Markov decision processes with incomplete state estimation, J. Math. 
Anal. .Appl. 10 (1965) 174-205. 
[4] C. Boutilier, Epistemic entrenchment in autoepistemic logic, Fund. Inform. 17 (l-2) (1992) 5-30. 
[5] C. Boutilier, Revision sequences and nested conditionals, in: Proceedings IJCAI-93, Chambery, France 
(1993) 519-525. 
[ 6 ] C. Boutilier, Unifying default reasoning and belief revision in a modal framework, Artijicial Intelligence 
68 (1994) 33-85. 
[ 71 C. Boutilier, On the revision of probabilistic belief states, Notre Dame J. Formal Logic 36 (1) ( 1995) 
158-183. 
[ 8 ] C. Boutilier, Abduction to plausible causes: an event-based model of belief update, Art$cial Intelligence 
83 (1) (1996) 143-166. 
[ 91 C. Boutilier, Iterated revision and minimal revision of conditional beliefs, J. Philos. Logic 25 (3) ( 1996) 
262-305. 
[lo] P.E. Caines, Linear Stochastic Systems (Wiley, New York, 1988). 
[ 111 A. Darwiche and J. Pearl, On the logic of iterated belief revision, in: Proceedings 5th Conference on 
Theoretical Aspects of Reasoning about Knowledge, Pacific Grove, CA (1994) 5-23. 
[ 121 N. Friedman and J.Y. Halpem, A knowledge-based framework for belief change, Part II: Revision and 
update, in: Proceedings 5th International Conference on Principles of Knowledge Representation and 
Reaso.aing (KR-94), Bonn ( 1994) 190-201. 
[ 131 N. Friedman and J.Y. Halpem, Plausibility measures: a user’s guide, in: Proceedings Ilth Conference 
on Uncertainty in Artificial Intelligence, Montreal, Quebec ( 1995) 175-184. 
[ 141 N. Friedman and J.Y. Halpem, A qualitative Markov assumption and its implications for belief change, 
in: Proceedings 12th Conference on Uncertainty in Artijkial Intelligence, Portland, OR ( 1996) 263-273. 
[ 151 P. Gardenfors, Knowledge in Flux: Modeling the Dynamics of Epistemic States (MIT Press, Cambridge, 
MA, 1988). 
[ 161 H. Geffner, A qualitative model for temporal reasoning with incomplete information, in: Proceedings 
AAAI-96, Portland, OR (1996) 1176-1181. 
[ 171 M. Goldszmidt and J. Pearl, On the consistency of defeasible databases, Artificial Intelligence 52 (1991) 
121-149. 
[ 181 M. Goldszmidt and J. Pearl, Rank-based systems: a simple approach to belief revision, belief update 
and reasoning about evidence and actions, in: Proceedings 3rd International Conference on Principles 
of Knowledge Representation and Reasoning (KR-92), Cambridge, MA (1992) 661-672. 
[ 191 M. Goldszmidt and J. Pearl, Reasoning with qualitative probabilities can be tractable, in: Proceedings 
8th Conference on Uncertainty in AI, Stanford, CA (1992) 112-120. 
[20] A. Grove, Two modellings for theory change, J. Philos. Logic 17 (1988) 157-170. 
[21] H. Katsuno and A.O. Mendelzon, On the difference between updating a knowledge database and 
revising it, in: Proceedings 2nd International Conference on Principles of Knowledge Representation 
and Reasoning (KR-9I), Cambridge, MA (1991) 387-394. 
[22] H.A. Kautz, The logic of persistence, in: Proceedings AAAI-86, Philadelphia, PA ( 1986) 401405. 
[ 231 I. Levi, Iteration of conditionals and the Ramsey test, Synthese 76 (1) (1988) 49-81. 
[24] W.S. Lovejoy, A survey of algorithmic methods for partially observed Markov decision processes, Ann. 
Oper. Res. 28 (1991) 47-66. 
1251 D.G. Luenberger, Introduction to Dynamic Systems: Theory, Models and Applications (Wiley, New York, 
1979). 
[26] R.C. Moore, A formal theory of knowledge and action, in: J. Allen, J. Hendler and A. Tate, eds., 
Readings in Planning (Morgan Kaufmann, San Mateo, CA, 1985) 480-519. 
[27] H. Rott, Belief change using generalized epistemic entrenchment, J Logic Language and Information 1 
( 1) ( 1992) 45-78. 
[28] R.B. Scherl and H.J. Levesque, The frame problem and knowledge-producing actions, in: Proceedings 
AAAI-93, Washington, DC (1993) 689-693. 
1291 K. Schlechta, D. Lehmann and M. Magidor, Distance semantics for belief revision, in: Proceedings 6th 
Conference on Theoretical Aspects of Rationality and Knowledge, Amsterdam ( 1996) 137-145. 
[30] R.D. Smallwood and E.J. Sondik, The optimal control of partially observable Markov processes over a 
finite horizon, Oper. Res. 21 (1973) 1071-1088. 
316 C. Boutilier/Artijicial Intelligence 98 (1998) 281-316 
[31] W. Spohn, Ordinal conditional functions: A dynamic theory of epistemic states, in: W.L. Harper and 
B. Skyrms, eds., Causation in Decision, Belief Change and Statistics, Vol. 2 (Reidel, Dordrecht, 1987) 
105-134. 
[32] M.-A. Williams, Transmutations of knowledge systems, in: Proceedings 5th International Conference 
on Principles of Knowledge Representation and Reasoning (KR-94). Bonn (1994) 619-629. 
[33] M. Winslett, Reasoning about action using a possible models approach, in: Proceedings AAAI-88, 
St. Paul, MN (1988) 89-93. 
